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1. Moral Goodness and Human Form
In an essay discussing practical wisdom and its relation to philosophy, Alasdair
MacIntyre makes the following claim:
We all of us begin our adult lives with some classification and rank ordering of
goods, some hierarchy of ends, some implicit or partially explicit conception of
human good that we have acquired from our upbringing and from the culture into
which that upbringing and was an initiation. (emphasis mine)15
In this essay and elsewhere,16 MacIntyre elaborates an Aristotelian account of moral
goodness, which gives central place to the notion of human good.17 On the Aristotelian
view, human good plays two important roles. First, human good determines what counts
as goodness and badness in human action.18 And hence human good determines what
counts as moral goodness, for moral evaluations speak to excellence and defect in the
action and character of human beings considered as such. As one proponent puts it:
“ ‘That was morally good action’ is equivalent to ‘Qua human action, that was
good’ or ‘That was good human action’ and ‘That was a morally bad human
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action’ is equivalent to ‘Qua human action, that was bad’ or ‘That was a bad
human action.’ ”19
According to this Aristotelian account, moral judgments share a conceptual structure with
judgments of excellence and defect in other living things, including plants and animals.
In each case, the goodness of parts and activities is understood in relation to the good of
the being in question as defined by its life-form –in relation to a particular plant-good or
animal-good, in the one case, and in relation to human good in the other. The notion of
human good, then, is central to what counts as good action for human beings as such –
i.e. moral goodness.
In addition, human good is also at the center of ethical understanding. What the
morally virtuous person grasps – what she reasons well about in a practical way – is
human goodness, with respect to action and choice. And here there is a difference
between the human case and other life-forms. On the one hand, the Aristotelian asserts
that the notion of human good is conceptually similar to the notion of good, or
flourishing, as applied to other living things.20 With humans, just as with oaks and tigers,
we evaluate individuals in light of the form which they bear.21 On the other hand,
however, our knowledge of human form – or, equivalently, our knowledge of human
good – is of a different sort from our knowledge of other life-forms. For in the case of
other life-forms, humans come to learn about them through empirical observation. But in
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the case of human-form, we come to know what “the human” is by coming to know how
to act. We acquire our (initial) understanding of human form from living as a human.
In this paper, I want to explore this idea, in order to spell out the claim that
knowledge of human form is “from within”, whereas knowledge of other life-forms is
“from without.” What is meant by “from without” is perhaps more clear: We learn about
other life-forms by observing them. We learn about them empirically. However, what is
meant by knowing “from within” is less clear. My question, then, is this: how and why
does being brought up as a human being – being educated to have a developed rational
will – provide one with a knowledge of human form (or, human good)? My question
picks up the idea expressed in the quote from MacIntyre above, but it has a slightly
different focus. For whereas MacIntyre speaks of all adults having “some” conception of
human good, I am asking about knowledge of the human form, which implies a true
conception of human good. My focus, accordingly, will be on the knowledge of human
form as given through the practical virtues, since I take it that the virtues provide a person
with a correct perception of human action and a correct understanding of human good.
So the question is: how does the possession of the moral virtues provide a human being
with knowledge of the very form she bear – the very form that is realized in her virtuous
actions?
2. Moral Virtue and Connatural Knowledge
To make progress on this question, let us begin with Elizabeth Anscombe’s
discussion of connatural knowledge. Anscombe describes connatural knowledge as “the
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sort of knowledge someone has who has a certain virtue”22

It is “the capacity to

recognize what action will accord with and what ones will be contrary to virtue.”23 The
idea of connatural knowledge, then, embodies that thought that part of having a virtue is
the ability to recognize which actions accord with it, and which are against it. However,
what is distinctive about connatural knowledge is not only the object known – what
actions will count as courageous, generous, just, etc. – but the way it is known.
Connatural knowledge comes through a person’s disposition toward virtuous actions, and
away from vicious ones. In contrast, a merely clever person may know that a certain
action would be just, or mean, but he knows it in a different way – “out of a certain
sharpness of intelligence.”
To see the difference between the connatural knowledge of the virtuous and
knowledge of the merely clever, consider a particular case in which there is a debt owed.
The person with the virtue of justice recognizes the fact of a debt as a reason to repay it.
Thus her reasoning can be represented as follows:
1) I owe Sam a debt.

(Or, to make it a case for charity: Sam is in need of help)

2) The time has come to repay, and I have the means to do so. (I am positioned
to help)
3) So I’ll pay! (So I’ll help!)
If you were to ask the just person what action was in accord with justice here, she would
be able to tell you – e.g. repaying the debt on Tuesday, when she usually sees Sam. And
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she could also tell you which actions would be against justice – e.g., lying to Sam and
telling him she doesn’t have the money, or changing her phone number to avoid him.
She knows which action accord with justice, and which are against it. However, she
knows what the just action is through her perception of the situation and what it requires
– via her recognition that she would be justified in repaying the debt, her recognition that
the fact of the debt owed is a good reason to repay it.24 She perceives the situation in
light of certain salient considerations, and she recognizes that those considerations have a
claim on her actions.25 That she does so such is partly constitutive of having the virtue of
justice. She knows that a certain action is just through her understanding of what she
ought to do. 26
The merely clever man can also know that repaying the debt will count as just.
But we cannot represent him coming to this knowledge as the virtuous does – i.e. through
the recognition of the fact of the debt as a reason to repay. For the fact that he does not
reason that way is part of his being merely clever, and not just. The clever man can
recognize that repaying the debt is the just action, and that other options are unjust ones,
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but this will be because of an understanding of how the concept of ‘justice’ works, and
not in virtue of recognizing considerations of justice as having a direct claim on how he
should act. Thus the merely clever man can recognize that an action would be just or
unjust, but how this fact figures into his reasoning will be different from the case of the
just. We can imagine him reasoning as follows:
1) I owe Sam a debt. (Or, to make it a case for charity: Sam is need of help)
2) Not repaying your debts counts as unjust. (Helping others is considered
charitable)
3) People look down on unjust actions, punishing the unjust with social
ostracism. (People look down on uncharitable actions, criticizing them).
4) I want to avoid social ostracism (I don’t want to have my actions criticized).
5) So I’ll repay the debt!

(So I’ll help!)

Here, the fact that an action counts as just figures into the reasoning of the merely clever
person, but it is fact is of instrumental significance, and that is part of his being merely
clever and not just. Unlike the virtuous, he cannot be said to know that repaying the debt
is just simply by considering what to do in the situation.27
3. Virtue as Knowledge Human Form

It seems we can say, then, that the vicious person’s knowledge that an action will count as just
is “from without” – it comes from observing how other humans talk and react. And one could
gain this knowledge without living a human life; there is no essential connection between having
knowledge in this way and acting well as a human being. For example, an alien anthropologist
might realize that such-and-such an action will be considered ‘just’ simply by observing how our
species works.
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So far I have been trying to spell out a special sort of knowledge that the moral
virtues give to their possessor, following some suggestions about connatural knowledge
from Anscombe. I now what to show that this special sort of knowledge amounts to a
knowledge of human form, and thus that the moral virtues provide knowledge of human
form.
A moral virtue is distinguished by some characteristic type of response to a given
type of consideration. Thus the virtue of courage is distinguished by a response of
boldness, or steadfastness, in the face of things recognized as dangerous, while the virtue
of helpfulness involves perceiving the needs of others and taking those needs as a reason
to provide assistance.

As the examples from the last section suggested, what

distinguishes the virtuous person are the reasons for which she acts. The responses of the
moral virtues embody distinctive patterns of practical inference. The premises for such
inference are considerations present in the situation, and the conclusions are the actions
which are justified by those considerations. Thus a virtue involves: 1) seeing situations
in light of salient normative considerations –i.e. registering certain factors as
considerations in determining one’s actions (e.g. “there is someone who needs some
help”) and 2) drawing certain practical conclusions from those considerations (e.g. “so
I’ll help him!”). The virtuous person recognizes the features of the situation as meriting a
practical response (in emotion and action) and she responds accordingly.
For example, the virtue of gratitude requires 1) that you recognize when another
has given you a (undeserved) good and 2) that you regard this as a reason to express your
thanks to that person. In addition, the practical reasoning relevant to virtue culminates in
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particular action, and this means that the virtuous will take into account various factors in
determining what is right to do here and now. The virtue of gratitude, then, will lead a
person to express her thanks in a way that is responsive to particular features of the
situation, including considerations relevant to the other virtues. (Thus, she will not steal
something to give to another as an expression of thanks, since stealing is a violation of
justice). So the grateful person’s reasoning can be represented thusly:
1) she helped me out so much with that project, and really didn’t have to
2) so I’ll express my thanks!
3) a good way to express my thanks is getting her that novel she wants to read.
4) so I’ll get her the novel!
So it is part of virtue that one reasons well – that one correctly grasps what one
ought to do and does it. However, the virtues are also the practical excellences of human
beings considered as such. That is, they provide an account of what counts as acting well
for us as human beings. The moral virtues speak to our goodness qua human beings, and
not to our goodness qua something more particular or local – qua Americans, or women,
or people with our aesthetic tastes, etc. So if the virtuous person knows what she ought
to do, and if the virtues characterize the goodness in human action, then the virtuous
person also knows what a human being ought to do. To possess a virtue is to know how
a human should act. However, to know how a human should act is to know what the
good of the human being is, what counts as living and acting well for a human. And
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knowledge of that just is knowledge of human form. Thus the virtuous possess, through
the understanding embodied in practical inference, a knowledge of human form.
If this sounds odd, we should remember that virtue is not manifest only in discreet
“acts of virtue,” as if those could be set off from the “normal” or “neutral” things that a
person does. Rather, as MacIntyre stresses, the virtues apply to all domains of life.28 The
moral virtues speak to everything a human being does in a way that is guided by reasons:
how a human should eat her dinner, repay her debts, earn a living, play music with
friends, etc. The way in which any of these things is do be done is a matter of virtue;
considerations of virtue are relevant to all of them. Thus the knowledge of human form
that comes via the virtues will be manifest across the whole range of human activities that
are done on the basis of reasons. It is a knowledge that is on display in the living of a
human life, and it an essential part of living that sort of life.
While oak trees and sparrows have a distinctive good, it is no part of those lifeforms for the adults of the species to have a conception of oak-good or sparrow-good. In
contrast, it belongs to “the human” to form a conception of its own form of life. And in
this respect, our knowledge of our own form has a different status for us than our
knowledge of other life-forms. For suppose it were true, as the result of a massive effort
of botanical education, that every human now living entered adulthood with the
knowledge of oak-form, with a conception of “the oak” and what its flourishing required.
Even if all humans happen to be educated about oaks, and even if knowing about oakform is valuable and worthwhile, such knowledge is not proper to the human in the way
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that knowledge of human-form is proper. Such knowledge of oak-form is accidental in
the life of the human being in a way that knowledge of human-form is not: A human
being as such is not defective for failing to knowing about oaks, whereas a human being
with no grasp of human form is defective qua human.
This should come as no surprise, in light of what we have seen about virtue. For
virtue brings with it a knowledge of human form that comes through the virtuous
person’s understanding of what counts as a reason for what. A person no grasp of human
form, then, would possess none of the virtues and have no grasp of what counts as a
reason for what, and surely that would be a defective sort of human life.
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